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1. Introduction 
In this paper, I examine the impact of Board of Directors education background on firm’s 
performance for European firm. Board of Director arose as a response to the agency problem 
inherent in governing corporation, and has since then become the representative of shareholders to 
establish corporate management policies and to make decision on major issues. According to the 
upper echelon theory developed by Hambrick and Mason (1984), an organization’s outcomes – 
strategic choices and performance – are partially predicted by managerial characteristics, one of 
which is the manager’s formal education level. Following empirical researches have been 
examining this association, notably the relationship between mutual fund manager education level 
and fund’s performance; CEO formal training and corporate outcomes; but only a few has lined 
Board of Director’s education and firm’s performance, such as Darmadi (2010) with Indonesia firm 
sample. However, Darmadi paper does not propose any mean to alleviate endogeneity issue, which 
limit the causality interpretation between the variables in question. I will tackle the dynamic 
endogeneity issue by employing the GMM panel data model, proposed by Wintoki et al (2012) to 
give a better understanding about the causal relationship between board of director characteristics 
and firm’s performance. 
1.1 Background and motivation 
Why should director educational background influence firm performance? One obvious reason is 
that education background is as a proxy for intelligence and expertise, and more intelligent 
directors will be able to give better strategic guidance to a firm’s management team, which will 
have positive effect on the firm’s performance. There are a number of studies which find that a 
more capable Board of Directors has a greater capacity to improve firm’s performance and are 
competent in discrete tasks, such as hiring/firing the CEO, compensation and incentive package 
for executives, merger and acquisition activities, or defending against a takeover bid. Another 
reason is that more highly educated directors are more likely to advise sophisticated methodologies 
to improve firm performance. For example, it has been demonstrated by Graham and Harvey 
(2002) that CFO with finance background are more likely to use sophisticated methodologies when 
conducting capital budgeting and when estimating the cost of capital. Finally, it may be that 
director education is positively related to his/her social capital. That is, directors with higher 
educational profiles enjoy more social ties to other directors, executives and government officials, 
which may improve the performance of the firm. This is especially true for companies in early 
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stages that need for environmental linkages between the firm and outside resources (Kumar and 
Zattoni (2013)).  
Hambrick and Mason (1984) laid the groundwork for explaining the relationship between upper 
echelons (senior managers) background characteristics and organization’s outcome. The authors 
argued thatrganizational outcomes—both strategies and effectiveness—are viewed as reflections 
of the values and cognitive bases of powerful actors in the organization. It is expected that, to some 
extent, such linkages can be detected empirically. From the resource-based view perspective, the 
sustainable competitive advantages of a firm depend on how it utilizes its unique bundle of 
resources (i.e. both tangible and intangible assets) to achieve organizational effectiveness, and 
human resource is one main contributor to the competitive advantage. However, some form of 
human capitals are costly, and an early investment in such capitals may not yield immediate effect 
substantially enough to offset the cost. Besides these two theories, managerial networking theory 
also argues that top executives’ social ties and connections with salient external stakeholders can 
help their firms reduce transaction costs through facilitated exchange of resources, information and 
knowledge. This is especially true for directors, as many of them are appointed to utilize their 
relationship to external resources and industrial expertise (Kumar and Zattoni 2013).  
Based on those premises, educational background should has certain contribution to a director’s 
decision making and thus, should effect the company’s performance. Furthermore, there are only 
few quantifiable and identifiable factor when determining the competency of a director. 
Interpersonal skills, leadership ability and strategic vision are among the traits that director should 
possess; these can be difficult to identify and even more difficult to measure. As a result, recruiters 
rely on those characteristics which they may be able to observe: work experience, track record, and 
highly likely education. From a personal perspective, I find it interesting to observe how managerial 
education background may effect a firm’s performance as suggested by upper echelons theory 
(Hambrick and Mason(1984)), given how much resources and efforts an average person spend on 
their education. 
1.2 Research questions  
The objective of my research is to examine whether director education background affects 
company’s performance; and if the causal relationship exist, does it subject to dynamic endogeneity 
issue. I will discuss further about dynamic endogeneity, its remedy in corporate governance studies 
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proposed by Wintoki et al (2012) in the literature review. Board of director usually decide on 
strategic issues of the firm, and the effect of their decisions does not necessarily show immediately 
on the firm’s performance, but rather later on. If director education is a proxy for their competence 
in decision making, I expect director education to have a lagged effect on firm’s performance. With 
all that being said, here are my research questions: 
1. Is there a relationship between board of director education background and firm’s 
performance? 
2. Whether the relationship in question (1) – if exist, is dynamic in its nature? 
3. Does board of director education background effect firm’s performance with a lag? 
1.3 Contribution to existing research  
To my knowledge, this is the first study to provide a comprehensive view on the relationship 
between director educational background and firm’s performance on a European dataset. The 
relationship between corporate governance and firm’s performance is a relatively well-studied 
topic in finance literature, with the first notion dated back to Adam Smith (1776), when he noted 
that directors of joint stock companies may not have the full intention to play the role of “vigilant 
guardian” over the owner’s wealth. Further theoretical researches, notably Fama (1980), Fama and 
Jensen (1983), Holmstrom (1999), have stressed the need of a governance body to solve the agency 
issue and ensure the interest of investors is protected. Following empirical researches, such as 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1988), Bhagat and Black (200) have focused on board composition and 
firm’s performance, observing the effect of main structural variables of a board i.e board size, 
independence level on firm’s performance. Further characteristics, such as age (Bonn et al (2004), 
gender (Adams and Ferreira (2009)), busyness (Fich and Shivdasani (2006)), have been examined 
and yielded mixed result on firm’s performance. However, few studies have paid attention to the 
role of board education on firm’s performance, even though education is a much studied 
characteristics of managers. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) studied in depth the relationship between 
fund manager education and fund’s performance and found that managers who attended better 
undergraduate institutions have systematically higher risk-adjusted excess return. Bertrand and 
Schoar (2002) found out that managers with MBA degree will follow more aggressive strategies. 
To my knowledge, only Darmadi (2013) has addressed the relationship between board of director 
education and firm performance, in the context of developing country. The author recognized the 
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endogeneity issue, but did not propose any solution. In this paper, I will address the endogeneity 
issue by employing GMM estimator proposed by Wintoki (2012) as a way to alleviate sources of 
endogeneity in corporate governance studies. One reason why director education study is scarce is 
because director education data is hard to collect and is noisy, especially for the European dataset. 
I will discuss this issue further in limitation and data description. 
1.4 Main findings  
Static OLS suggests a positive correlation between board of director’s education and firm’s 
performance. This finding is similar to that of Darmadi (2013) in term of direction and magnitude. 
However, once I apply the dynamic model to alleviate the endogeneity effect, the correlation 
disappeared. This goes against upper echelon hypothesis of the correlation between manager’s 
characteristics and organization’s outcomes. One plausible explanation for this finding is that both 
director’s education and firm’s performance are effected by an unobservable heterogeneity factor 
– for example director’s competence. One clear insight that emerges from the dynamic OLS model 
is the importance of lagged performance when assessing the effect of board characteristics on 
firm’s performance. The R2 improved significantly from 0.21 to 0.47, implying that past dependent 
variables help to explain a significant portion of current performance. This result matches the 
underlying assumption of the model, that is board characteristic is a choice variable that arises 
through a process of bargaining between the various actors in a firm’s nexus contract, where the 
bargaining process is influenced by past performance and the actor’s belief about the cost and 
benefits of particular board characteristics. One concern is that board decision has lagged effect on 
firm’s performance, so I also test the model on a set of lagged dependent variables. After 
controlling for endogeneity factors, I also found no  
1.5 Limitations of the study  
This study employed the dynamic GMM panel estimation to reduce the endogeneity effect in 
traditional ordinary least square regression method. The idea behind this methodology is simple: 
Using past values as instrument for endogenous variables in cases where natural experiment or 
“external” instruments are hard to impose. However, the method comes with some limitations.The 
most significant one is potential problem of weak instruments, as the model employ lagged 
variables for identification. Increasing the instrument’s lag length makes them more exogenous, 
but may also make them weaker; so it is important to choose the appropriate lag length. I will 
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perform a series of test to check whether the instruments are strong enough under the exogenous 
constraint. Furthermore, the dynamic model assumes weak rational expectations (Muth,1961; 
Lovell, 1986), which means that future unexpected changes in performance are purely an 
expectational error, and implies that the empirical model includes every variable that could 
conceivably jointly affect both the dependent and explainatory variables. Given the imperfect 
nature of proxies in empirical research, this is unlikely to be the case.  
Regarding the education variables, there are limitations to the way I define “education level” 
variables. Defining one’s formal education level by the degree they obtained is arbitrageous at best, 
as a master degree from a Germany university does not necessarily yield the same value as one 
from a French university. The variable “prestigious” is calculated based on available university 
ranking tables, which methodologies are subjective and biased towards their own set of criteria. 
Averaging each university/institution ranking in all ranking tables does not make sure that my 
ranking is unbiased, but rather reduce the bias in each ranking. Last but not least, the method 
requires company to have data for all variables in at least 6 consecutive years, which reduced my 
dataset size significantly.  
1.6 Structure of the study  
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. In Section 2, I review relevant literature on 
corporate board function and formation, as well as the relationship between director education and 
firm’s performance. Section 3 introduces the hypotheses, whereas Section 4 describes data used in 
the analysis and the methodology applied. Section 5 presents the results of my analysis and Section 
6 concludes the thesis offering suggestions for future research. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Function and formation of corporate board  
Since the first economic address by Adam Smith in 1776, Board of Directors has always been a 
topic of interest among economists due to its crucial role in a corporation. Board could be simply 
put as a product of regulation: Between state incorporation laws and the stock exchange governance 
requirements, most firms are required to have a board that meets a multitude of requirements: 
number of members, various committees, and some fraction of the directors may be obligated to 
have some nominal independence from management (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003). However, its 
prevalent influence over time, across boundaries and in different organizational forms, has made it 
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a market solution for agency problem that troubles any large organization. Agency problem arises 
from conflict of interest between principal agency and shareholders, so Board of Director was 
created to ensure that principal agents are appropriately monitored and advised to maximize 
shareholder value. Given its crucial role both in term of internal management and strategic direction, 
Board of Director usually consist of experienced executives, industry experts and academia with 
prominent track record. 
2.1.1 Function of Corporate Board 
The board has the ultimate legal authority over decision-making within the firm. According to the 
American Bar Association’s Committee on Corporate Laws (1994, p. 4), this means, amongst 
others, that the board must review and approve fundamental operating, financial, and other 
corporate plans and strategies. (Adams and Ferriera 2007) categorized those activities into two 
functions: advisory and monitoring. The advisory function involves the provision of expert advice 
to the CEO and access to critical information and resources (Fama and Jensen, 1983). As one 
director puts it in Lorsch and Maciver (1989, p. 64): “Directors are sounding boards for 
management. They contribute their opinions as to general policy, and their judgement whenever a 
problem comes up.” Thus, the board draws upon the expertise of its members to counsel 
management on the firm’s strategic direction. Since many board members have full-time jobs in 
other corporations, they rely on the CEO to provide them with the necessary information to evaluate, 
for example, whether the company should enter a new line of business. The more information the 
manager provides and the better the manager synthesizes the information, the better is the board’s 
advice. The monitoring role assess, discipline, and remove ineffective management teams, to 
pursue that the conduct of the management team is in line with shareholder interest. Advisory and 
monitoring roles of a sole board complement each other, because the board uses any information 
the manager provides during the advisory process both to make better recommendations and to 
implement better decisions. Adams and Ferriera (2007) suggest that this is not necessarily the case, 
as shareholder may play off one role against another in accordance with their strategic intention. 
For example, they may appoint more inside directors to encourage the CEO to disclose more 
information, and at the same time reduce the monitoring intensity of the management team. When 
the two roles are separated in the dual board model – in which the BoD is divided into two bodies: 
the supervisory board and the management board – the management does not face the trade-off in 
the provision of information. This purpose could also be achieved by the use of board committees. 
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In particular, the role of audit committee in the sole board system is similar to that of a supervisory 
board.  
2.1.2 Formation of board of director and firm performance 
2.1.2.1 Impact of board size on performance  
Much of the literature on board size has called for smaller boards. The argument is that smaller 
groups are more productive and can monitor the firm more effectively. Larger groups are usually 
associated with free-rider problems and higher co-ordination cost, and hence are not good monitors.  
Jensen (1993) suggest that the optimal board size is seven or eight, as the higher board size is less 
likely to function effectively and are easier for CEO to control. However, the author also note that 
as the board size is small, it is hard for internal director to openly participate openly and critically 
in effective evaluation and monitoring of the CEO, so ideally the CEO should be the only inside 
director. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) agrees with this idea, stating that when the board gets bigger, it 
becomes hard for all board members to express their ideas and opinions in the limited time frame 
of the board meeting. In a worse case scenario, too many board member will lead to free-riding 
problem, in which some directors herd their decisions towards those more active ones in the Board.  
The results of Yermack (1996), who finds a negative relation between Q and board size for 452 
large U.S. industrial corporations between 1984 and 1991, are interpreted by many to provide 
empirical support for the notion that smaller boards are better.   
Most of the above studies are conducted in the US sampling large public companies, so one may 
argue that the consensus result could be driven by the sample firm characteristics. Studies of board 
size effects in smaller firms outside US are of interest because the factors that drive the choice of 
board  structure in this firms type could differ from the factors influencing board size in large public 
firms. For example, small and midsized firms are frequently closely held, so the influence of agency 
problems between managers and owners on decisions affecting board size and structure are 
probably less prevalent in this class of firms Eisenberg et al (1998) studied approximately 900 
small Finnish firm and found a negative correlation between firms’ profitability, as measured by 
industry-adjusted return on assets, and board size. Therefore, a board-size effect exists even among 
SME in firms outside the US. The authors also provided an interesting explanation regarding the 
relationship between board size and firm's performance. Firm might increase their board size in 
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response to poor profitability, thus lead to a negative correlation between board size and 
profitability. 
Not all the odds are against a big board. Coles et al (2008) argue that certain classes of firms 
actually are likely to benefit from larger boards and boards with more insider representation. Firms 
with greater advising requirements, such as those that are diversified across industries, larger firms, 
and firms that rely on debt financing, are more likely to benefit from a larger board of directors. 
The relation between Tobin's Q and board size is U-shaped, which suggest that either very small 
or very large boards are optimal. Dalton, Daily, Johnson, and Ellstrand (1999) argue that larger 
boards offer better advice to the CEO, especially those of firms operate in multiple segments and 
tend to be complex. Diversification, firm size, and leverage are all proxies for complexity and the 
CEO’s need for advice. As firm complexity increases along any of these dimensions, so, too, does 
the need for a bigger board. In a recent paper with empirical data from India, Kumar and Zattoni 
(2013) indicated that there was a significant and positive association between board size and 
financial performance. This result may reflect the nature of the environment in which corporations 
operate in India whereby greater board size supports the resource dependency theory, which stress 
the need for environmental linkages between the firm and outside resources.  
2.1.2.2 Busy board and firm performance 
The issue of ‘‘over-boarded’’ directors (directors that serve on several firms’ boards) has received 
attention in both the academic literature and the business press. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find 
that firms with busy boards, defined as those in which a majority of independent directors hold 
three or more directorships, have lower market-to-book ratios, weaker profitability, and lower 
sensitivity of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover to firm performance. Core, Holthausen and 
Larcker (1999) find that CEOs of firms with busy directors are paid excessively, suggesting that 
busy boards may not effectively monitor management. Consistent with these suspected 
disadvantages of busy boards, the National Association of Corporate Directors, the Council of 
Institutional Investors, and Institutional Shareholder Services (2012), have all recommended 
various limitations with respect to the number of boards on which directors serve. Coinciding with 
these recommendations, 74% of Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 companies limit the number of 
corporate directorships that their board members may hold. Field et al (2013), on the other hand, 
found out that firms with recent IPO, which have minimal experience and contact with capital 
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markets and likely rely heavily on their director for advising, are benefitted from a busy board in 
tasks such as advice on how to navigate public markets, deal with the media, interact with analysts, 
etc. As these IPO firms mature, the frequency of busy board declines as the demand for advising 
role decreases and demand for monitoring role increases. Perris et al. (2008) found that the busiest 
directors are older outsiders working as executives, bankers, or consultants. They do not find a 
negative reaction towards an appointment of a busy director and no evidence that multiple directors 
failed to fulfill their responsibility. 
2.1.2.3 Independence level and firm performance  
An independent Board of Director is favored by companies with diffuse ownership structure. Such 
structure will lead to vertical agency problem – conflict between a strong management and a 
disperse shareholder control. In such a context, independent directors have clear incentives to 
monitor management and, hence, they are the ideal market choice (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 
1983). At the end of the day, a firm purpose is to generate profit for its owners, so researches have 
been attempted to answer the question whether BoD independent level has any effect on firm’s 
performance and valuation.  
Conventional wisdom dictates that greater independence produce better corporate performance, 
and that board composition response to firm performance. Bhagat and Black (2001) initiated the 
studies of Board Independence and Firm Performance after series of regulatory changes requiring 
US public firms to have majority of independent directors.  They found out that low-profitability 
firms respond to their business troubles by following conventional wisdom and increasing the 
proportion of independent directors on their boards. There is no evidence, however, that this 
strategy works. Firms with more independent boards (proxied by the fraction of independent 
directors minus the fraction of inside directors) do not achieve improved profitability, and there are 
hints that they perform worse than other firms. This evidence suggests that the conventional 
wisdom on the importance of board independence lacks empirical support. 
Duchin et. al (2009) and Dahya & Mcconnell (2007) have studied the relation between outsider 
directors in the Board of Director and corporate performance, taking advantage of an exogenous 
shock to avoid endogeneity problems. Recent regulations have required corporations to increase 
the number of outside directors in their boards and the trend is growing among the corporate 
governance reformers. It is believed that outside directors, being independent from the management, 
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will challenge the management of the company more than the insider directors and that way protect 
the shareholders. Duchin et. al (2009) found that the effectiveness of outside directors depends 
heavily on the cost of acquiring information about and within the firm. It seems that in firms where 
outsiders were able to acquire information at low cost, boards may have been constituted with too 
many insiders, and the mandated increase in outsider representation was a boon for shareholders. 
In contrast, in firms where outsiders suffer from severe information disadvantages, the mandates 
appear to have harmed shareholder interests. However on average adding outside directors to the 
board does not help or hurt the performance. So the question is not whether but when are outside 
directors effective. Their emphasis on the conditional effectiveness of insiders and outsiders is 
consistent with an evolution in the literature away from the view that more outsiders are always 
better, and toward a more textured view that appreciates the strengths and weaknesses of both 
insiders and outsiders, depending on the firm’s environment (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008). 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) find that poorly performing companies tend to replace inside 
directors by independent directors in subsequent years. In particular, Hermalin and Weisbach 
control for previous firm performance, showing that the addition of independent directors comes 
after poor performance. 
Black and Kim (2011) rely on Korean's 1999 legal rules on public Korean firm regarding outside 
director as a shock to governance. They offer evidence that a reformed BoD with higher 
independence level will increase firm value - roughly 13% increase in Tobin's q, or about 46% in 
share price. Dahya and McConnell (2007) confirms this finding with UK firm sample, noticed that 
UK firms that moved to three outside directors in conformance with the Cadbury Committee 
recommendation show an improvement in operating performance both absolutely and relative to 
various peer group benchmarks from before to after moving to three outside directors. They also 
find that firms that move to three outside directors have a statistically significant stock price 
increase at the time of announcement of this decision. The results strongly suggest that adding 
outside directors led to improved performance by U.K. firms and increased value for shareholders. 
Lefort and Urzua (2009) found that an increasing proportion of outside directors affects company’s 
value after properly correcting for endogeneity from a Chile firm sample. 
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2.1.2.4 Board Gender Diversity and Firm Performance 
Historically, women hold few corporate board seats. In the US, women held 14.8% of Fortune 500 
board seats in 2007 (Catalyst, 2007). The percentage of female directors in Australia, Canada, 
Japan, and Europe is estimated to be 8.7%, 10.6%, 0.4%, and 8.0%, respectively (Equal 
Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Agency, 2006; and European Professional Women’s 
network EPWN, 2004). This situation is changing because boards around the world are under 
increasing pressure to choose female directors. Many proposals for governance reform explicitly 
stress the importance of gender diversity in the boardroom. This trend is supported by empirical 
researches showing that women appearance in the board room actually benefits the company. 
Carter et al (2003) examined the relationship between board diversity and firm performance for 
Fortune 1000 firms. After controlling for size, industry and other corporate governance measures, 
they found statistically significant positive relationships between the presence of women directors 
and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q.  Adam and Ferreira (2009) observed measures of board 
inputs: attendance behavior and committee assignment and concluded that female directors are less 
likely to experience attendance problems than male directors. Furthermore, female directors are 
more likely to sit on monitoring-related committees, except for compensation committee. This 
pattern, according to Adams and Funk (2012), is because male and female directors differ 
systematically in their core values and risk attitudes, but in ways that are differ from gender 
differences in general population. Due to the glass ceiling effect, female who want to go further in 
the corporate hierarchy must work harder and are less risk-averse than the gender’s average.  
However, imposing a quota of women appearance in the Board goes against the fundamental idea 
that firm choose Boards to maximize value. Ahern and Dittmar (2011) recorded a significant stock 
price drop and a large decline in Tobin’s Q over the following years after Norway mandated that 
40% of Norwegian firms’ director must be female. Due to the limited poll of female directors, new 
women directors usually hold multiple directorships, are far less experienced and younger than the 
existing men directors. Thus, the quota led firms to grow in size, make more acquisitions, and 
realize worse accounting return. Rose (2007) quoted the herding effect as the main reason behind 
female director inability to generate added value for their firms in Denmark market: Female 
directors do not belong to the “old guys club” as thus have to adopt the behavior and norms of their 
male counterparts to socialize themselves with counterparts. As a consequence, the gains from 
having female board members are never realized or reflected in any chosen performance measure. 
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Adams and Ferreira (2009) concluded that diversity has a positive impact on performance in firms 
that otherwise have weak governance, as measured by their abilities to resist takeovers. In firms 
with strong governance, however, enforcing gender quotas in the boardroom could ultimately 
decrease shareholder value. One possible explanation is that greater gender diversity could lead to 
over-monitoring in those firms. 
2.2 Board Education and Firm Performance 
2.2.1 Theoretical background on the correlation between manager education background and 
organization’s outcome. 
Educational background measures the cognitive ability of the executive, which influences firm 
performance: Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggested that executives' educational background 
provides an indication of their knowledge and skill base. The type and number of degree of 
education one chooses serve as indicators of her or his values and cognitive preferences. Thus, 
based on personal values, cognitive preferences and specialized education, we might expect those 
with formal education in engineering to utilize different cognitive models in making decisions than 
those with formal education in business or finance (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  Hitt and Barr 
(1989) found that managers with higher levels of formal education made different managerial 
compensation decisions from those with less formal education. Hambrick and Mason (1984) 
proposed that firms having top managers with less formal education experience more variability in 
performance. It is speculated that those with less formal education have greater variance in their 
cognitive models because these models are partially the product of more general educational 
training. As the education level increases, trainings and perspectives become more specialized and 
focused, thereby creating greater conformity in cognitive models. Thus, it concludes that amount 
and type of formal education affect the cognitive models developed and thereby the strategic 
choices made. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) took the same view on mutual fund manager 
performance, suggesting that managers from better school have higher inherent abilities or 
receiving direct benefits from a better education. 
Educational background uncover behavioral pattern of executives: Barker and Mueller (2004) 
found that companies run by CEO with degree in technical have significantly higher R&D 
investment than those run by CEO from other background. Conversely, CEOs with educational 
backgrounds in business or law tend to be more risk-adverse with regard to R&D. They also find 
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that if the CEO advanced via technical or marketing channels then they were more supportive of 
R&D than CEOs that advanced through the accounting, finance or legal channels. In another study, 
Graham and Harvey (2002) find that chief financial officers (CFOs) holding MBAs were more 
likely than other CFOs to use such learned techniques as net present value for capital budgeting 
and the capital asset pricing model in cost of capital calculations.  
Educational background and firm’s social capital: It is well known that education can be a strong 
indicator of social prestige and class status. A part of why the executive rose to his or her position 
is due to their social network. In addition to using social capital for personal advancement up the 
corporate ladder, research by Belliveau et. al (1996) and Burt (1992) finds that executives with 
higher educational profiles enjoy more “weak-ties” to government officials and other decision 
makers that can improve firm performance. For example, a CEO with strong social linkages to 
politicians and policy makers can help the company receive government contracts or favorable tax 
treatment. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) hypothesized that managers from high SAT (Scholastic 
Assessment Test) scores may provide indirect benefits via the network of connections to other 
members of the financial community it provides. Such connections could result in having better 
source of information, improved access to IPOs or preferential execution of trades. 
2.2.2 Empirical researches on manager education 
Vast majority of corporate governance literature studying about the relationship between executive 
performance/behavior and education focuses on executives and fund managers.  
Among empirical studies focused on the direct correlation between executive’s educational 
background and firm’s performance. Kaplan, Klebanov and Sorensen (2008) found no relation 
between educational level proxy (SAT score and college selective level) and firm’s performance. 
Gottesman and Morey (2008) found no positive relation between executive with either degree from 
prestigious school or an MBA degree with firm’s performance. The author found, on the other hand, 
that compensation is somewhat higher for executives who attend more prestigious school. In the 
context of China, Cheng et al. (2010) show that university degrees held by the board chairman are 
positively associated with seven measures of performance, namely earnings per 8 share (EPS), 
ROA, cumulative returns, cumulative abnormal returns, change in EPS, change in ROA, and 
market-to-book ratio. Guner et al (2008) focuses on the financial expertise of US companies’ 
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directors, of which they found that financial experts significantly affect corporate decisions, though 
not necessarily in the interest of shareholders. 
Most of the Board of Director social capital studies are done in the US, as this research branch 
requires disclosure data that only available in the U.S. Goldman et al (2012) studied about 
politically connected Board of Directors and the allocation of procurement contracts. The results 
suggest that, even within the confine of the strong legal system of the U.S., political board 
connections have a significant impact on the allocation of government resources. Companies 
usually looking or directors with industry expertise and relationship under the expectation that they 
may help to overcome information challenges, such as anticipating industry conditions and trends, 
and protecting against demand or supply shocks. Dass et al (2012) focused on this aspect and found 
that having directors with industry expertise and relationship will improve firm value and 
performance – especially when information problems are worse and boards have relatively greater 
power to monitor managers. 
There is an interesting line of research on the relationship between fund’s performance and 
manager’s education background. One early prominent study is that by Chevalier and Ellison 
(1999), when they observed that mutual fund managers who attended more selective undergraduate 
institutions perform better than those attended less selective undergraduate ones, after controlling 
for differences in risk characteristics, survivorship bias and differences in expense ratio. Bertrand 
and Schoar (2002) recorded that fund managers with MBA degree follow more aggressive 
strategies, by choosing to engage in higher level of capital expenditures, hold more debt and pay 
less dividends. Gottesman and Morey (2008), on the other hand, found that education background 
yield no effects on fund’s performance, except for the MBA variable. Managers who attend 
prestigious MBA program exhibit superior performance of both managers without MBA degree 
and managers with MBA from unranked programs. The author explained the result that rather than 
the manager simply being better, the argument is that items such as better support staff or better in-
house research cause the fund to perform better. 
2.3 Endogeneity in Corporate Governance Studies 
Arguably, the most pervasive issue confronting studies in empirical corporate finance is 
endogeneity, which can be loosely defined0 as a correlation between the explanatory variables and 
the error term in a regression. Endogeneity leads to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates 
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that make reliable inference virtually impossible. In many cases, endogeneity can be severe enough 
to reverse even qualitative inference. Yet, the combination of complex decision processes facing 
firms and limited information available to researchers ensures that endogeneity concerns are 
present in every study. Wintoki et al. (2012) categorized endogeneity into the three following types: 
1. Dynamic endogeneity: This is present when a variable’s current value is influenced by 
its value in the preceding time period. In the governance–performance relation, this occurs when 
the current governance structure, control characteristics and performance of the firm are 
determined by the firm’s past performance. For instance, previous poor firm performance will 
likely cause the firm’s shareholders to replace the board of directors with ensuing stricter corporate 
governance controls, which will in turn affect the firm’s current governance structure, some control 
characteristics and performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998) 
2. Simultaneity: This is present when two variables are co-determined, such that each 
variable may affect the other simultaneously. In the governance–performance relation, the 
corporate governance mechanisms and control characteristics may be determined concurrently 
with the firm’s level of performance. For example, the firm may choose a governance structure 
based on the expected performance of the firm; on the other hand, the firm’s performance outcome 
will guide the governance structure.  
3. Unobserved heterogeneity: This is present when a relation between two or more variables 
is affected by an unobservable factor. In the governance–performance relation, firm-specific 
characteristics—firm fixed-effects—may affect a firm’s governance structure, control char-
acteristics and performance, but may be unobservable to the researcher and therefore difficult to 
quantify. For instance, the ability of the firm’s managers and the CEO’s level of risk aversion could 
affect the firm’s performance (Haubrich, 1998). 
When available, natural experiments of carefully chosen strictly exogenous instruments, for 
instance regulatory changes, remain the “gold standard” for identifying the effect of explainatory 
variable on dependent variable. But given the rare occurrence of those natural experiments, 
corporate finance researches have to rely on other means to solve the endogeneity issue. Traditional 
research in corporate finance has explicitly recognized the last two sources of endogeneity and 
employed various method to excruciate those sources, notably two-stage least quares and fixed-
effects. Two-stage least squares is the standard method to deal with simultaneity. For unobservable 
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heterogeneity, the rationale is that traditional fixed-effects estimation can potentially reduce the 
bias arising from unobserved heterogeneity at an expense of a strong exogeneity assumption. That 
is, it assumes that current observations of the explainatory variable are completely independent of 
past values of the dependent one – an assumption Wintoki et al (2012) argue is not realistic as it 
omit the dynamic endogeneity source. They proposed a dynamic approach to tackle the 
endogeneity issue, which I will employ in this paper. 
3. Hypothesis 
This section will go through the research questions and hypotheses of this thesis. Board of Director 
characteristic and firm performance is a classic topic of corporate governance study, but studies 
about relationship between Director’s education and corporate growth measures are considerably 
scare. Among those empirical studies, none have addressed the endogeneous issue between the 
dependent variable and explainatory factors. Due to these considerations, I will study the 
relationship between Board of Director educational background and firm performance, using the 
GMM panel model proposed by Wintoki et al (2012) to tackle the endogeneity issue on an 
extensive data set of European companies. Based on previous studies about managers and their 
education, I conduct the following hypothesis: 
3.1 Doctoral Degree 
Following previous studies in the US context (Jalbert et al., 2002; Gottesman and Morey, 2006a; 
Bhagat et al., 2010), educational quality is defined by the level of educational qualification. 
According to upper-echelon theory, higher education level is considered a good proxy for higher 
level of knowledge base and intellectual competence (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). As such, it is 
expected that higher educational level leads to better performance. A number of previous empirical 
studies provide evidence that the educational level of upper echelons is positively associated with 
financial performance, such as Hambrick et al. (1996), Jalbert et al. (2002), Bhagat et al. (2010), 
and Cheng et al. (2010). In this study, board doctoral degree level in one year is defined as the 
percentage of directors who obtained a doctoral degree at least one year prior to the year in question. 
The first hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
H1: Doctoral degrees held by board members are positively correlated with firm performance.  
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3.2 Master of Business Administration (MBA) degree 
Degrees in Business Administration provide director with management expertise and networking, 
which is very beneficial in the strategic management of the firm (Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2009). As 
explained by Lipton and Herzberg (2006), those expertise are crucial for board members in 
fulfilling their obligations, such as to oversee the firm and to monitor the performance of senior 
management. Golec (1996) and Bhagat et al. (2010) find that managers and CEOs holding an MBA 
perform significantly better than those without such a degree. An MBA holder should know some 
basic tenets of management as well as how to recognize the firm’s bottleneck and profitable 
investments (Graham and Harvey, 2001). The author hypothesize that MBA holder will employ 
types of analyses that are taught in MBA programs, such as simulation analysis and value at risk 
(VaR). 
H2: Master of Business Administration (MBA) degrees held by board members are positively 
correlated with firm performance.   
3.3   Degree obtained from prestigious university 
A number of previous empirical studies also define educational quality by the prestige of schools 
attended by the manager, since more prestigious schools are viewed to offer higher educational 
quality than their less prestigious counterparts. Those studies use different sources to determine the 
ranks of the schools or universities. For example, Gottesman and Morey (2006a, 2006b) determine 
the prestige of schools from which the CEO graduates based on the mean SAT, GMAT, and LSAT 
scores of each school. Jalbert et al. (2002) and Bhagat et al. (2010) rank universities based on the 
ranking produced by the US News and World Reports. Jalbert et al. (2002) report that executives 
holding degrees from top 25 graduate schools perform significantly better than their peers.  
H3: Academic degrees held by board members from prestigious universities are positively 
correlated with firm performance 
4. Data and method 
4.1 Data  
Data on Board of Directors of public European firms from 1999 to 2013 will be collected from 
BoardEx, and missing data is hand-collected from the firms’ annual report and official website. 
BoardEx has education data of all individual directors they can collect, with each directors linked 
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to their firm by firm year and company’s ISIN. I arrange board of director data under panel form, 
with firm year and firm ISIN as sorting criteria. Each observation has director’s academic degree, 
status of the degree (graduated, attended and attending), year of graduation and name of the 
institution. The data also provides board of director size, number of independent director and 
whether the CEO is also Chairman of the Board. As this is a European dataset, some of the degrees 
are recorded in languages other than English, so I have to hand-select them and trace back to the 
institutions who issued the degree. I omit those which cannot be verified to reduce the dataset’s 
noise. Directors who either pursuing the degree or exit without graduating (degree status is 
attending/attended) are recorded as not obtained the degree in question. Based on the number of 
director from one firm in a given year, I filters firm years with sufficient education data of all 
directors to avoid any bias cause by data distortion. This initial sample from BoardEx includes 
41,217 observation from 872 firms in the period from 1999 to 2013. 
Next, using the unique ISIN firm identifiers from the above BoardEx file, I retrieve firm’s 
fundamental data from Thompson One. Even though the reported dataset timeline only range from 
1999 to 2013, I collect data of the previous ten years as the methodology requires lag data in the 
model. Variables of interest include net income, book and market value of asset, firm’s long-term 
debt, equity market performance in the whole period, number of segments defined by Global 
Industry Classification Standard (GICS) code, firm size. All metrics are converted into USD for 
the shake of simplicity and comparison. The initial sample from Thompson One includes 16,588 
observation in a panel format, sorted by firm year with the acquired fundamental data.  
Now, I am able to combine the BoardEX and Thompson One sample. Education data is reformatted 
into firm year’s board of director education level, and was matched to the fundamental data. The 
result is a panel data with each observation represents a firm year in the period from 1999 to 2013. 
As the methodology requires six consecutive firm years for the GMM model two-stage least 
squares regression analysis, I only keep observations that satisfy this constraint. This, plus the 
initial constraint of director education firm year, has significantly limited the amount of 
observations to 4221 firm years of 482 public firms in the period from 1999 to 2013. However, 
given the noisy nature of BoardEx data on director education, a prudent approach is necessary to 
reduce any bias from data manipulation. 
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4.1.1 Board of Director Education data. 
In this research, I employ three education variables to measure the educational level of the Board 
of Director, namely Doctorate, MBA and Prestigious as describe below: 
For MBA degree classification, directors who earned a Master in Business Administration are 
assigned value equal to 1 in the dummy variable MBA, and 0 otherwise. MBA degree is defined 
as a graduate degree achieved at a university or college that provides theoretical and practical 
Directors could also earn their MBA degree through short-term (6 months to one year) courses, 
which are designed for senior executive with years of experience of middle and larger capital 
companies. Those courses have no academic requirement for admission, and is popular among 
directors in my dataset (roughly 22% of directors attended executive training programs and 
graduated with an MBA degree). As I mentioned earlier, MBA degree has been employed by 
prominent corporate governance studies, such as Graham and Harvey (2001), Bertrand and Schoar 
(2003) as a method to measure the cognitive and management ability of managers. 
Doctoral degree is defined as an academic degree awarded by universities that, in most countries, 
qualifies the holder to teach at the university level in the degree's field, or to work in a specific 
profession. Director comes from different background with varied doctoral degrees acquired from 
different countries, including those with degrees recorded in languages other than English, so I 
have to hand-select those data and trace them back to the issued institutions to make sure that the 
degree is an assort of doctoral degree. For doctoral degree classification, directors who earned a 
doctorate are assigned value equal to 1 in the dummy variable Doctorate, and 0 otherwise. One 
concern about this variable is that the percentage of director with doctoral degree is low, which 
makes the variable insignificant. Fortunately, the average percentage of director with doctorate 
degree is around 28% in this sample, varied enough to make the variable significant.  
Prestigious is a variable to measure the percentage of directors who attend universities /institutions 
which are perceived to be prestigious. This variable was employed in other corporate governance 
studies, such as Palia (2001) and Bhagat et al (2010). In those studies, authors either relied on a 
preferred public ranking table or used dated ranking to decide whether the university is prestigious. 
Some studies in the U.S leverage their consolidated Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT) as a 
benchmark for university ranking. However, Europe does not have such uniform standardize test, 
so I rely on public university ranking publications for the school classification, as those are the 
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only public materials related to this topic. Each of the ranking above has some limitations, most of 
which comes from bias selection and methodology. As most of the paper citation databases are 
focused on papers written in English, university with researches written in other languages will 
have significantly lower score in research citation-related indicators. Some of the rankings only 
rank universities which provides Bachelor, Master and Doctoral studies, thus ignore higher 
education institutions with focus solely on post-graduate or undergraduate education, for instance 
liberal arts colleges and research institutions. Therefore, I choose to use the average available 
ranking of each university in all publication within the reported period as the ranking of each 
university/institution. Employed university ranking publication, their methodology and limitation 
is discussed in details in appendix A. According to this classification, 614 out of 2271 universities/ 
institutions in the dataset are ranked and thus classified as prestigious. Some directors may attend 
more than one university/institutions, so I choose the one associated with the highest degree that 
director obtained to represent him/her for prestigious variable. Degree obtained are clustered into 
three categories: Bachelor and equivalent, Master and equivalent, and Doctorate and equivalent. If 
the director obtain multiple degrees at highest level, the one earned from higher ranking will be 
chosen to represent him/her for prestigious variable. Due to the nature of MBA degree as described 
earlier, I do not take into account the university/ institution associated with MBA in this prestigious 
variable. For example, if director A obtained one Bachelor degree, one Master degree, two 
Doctorate degrees and one MBA degree from university U1, U2, U3, U4, U5 respectively, with 
university ranking as following (U1 < U2 < U3 < U4< U5), then the one associated with director 
A is U4, as it is the most prestigious university from which the director obtained an academic 
degree. Directors who attended a prestigious university are assigned value equal to 1 in the dummy 
variable prestigious, and 0 otherwise. 
4.1.2 Measuring performance 
The primary performance measure I use in this study is Return on Assets (ROA), where ROA is 
defined as operating income before depreciation, divided by fiscal year-end total assets value. 
Many studies used Tobin’Q – calculated by dividing Total market value of firm by Total asset 
value as a profitability measure. This can be a problem for a number of reasons. Tobin Q is a proxy 
for growth opportunities, and there is a strong theoretical reason argued by previous corporate 
governance studies to expect that growth opportunities are causes, rather than results of corporate 
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governance variables. Lehn et al. (2009), Lunk et al (2008) and Wintoki et al (2012) provided both 
theoretical framework and empirical research to support this notion. Therefore, I will use market-
to-book as a control variable rather than a performance measure. 
Wintoki (2012) argue that board structure is highly persistent. This can reduce the power of panel 
data estimator, and dynamic estimator also requires that we assume transient errors are uncorrelated. 
The author mitigated this concern by sampling two-year interval instead of every year. However 
in this paper, due to limited dataset, I choose one-year interval, and the statistic from Table 3 shows 
that this data is varied enough for transience assumption.  
4.1.3 Governance variables 
Besides the board of director education variables, I use board size and board composition as control 
variables for board of director characteristics, which defined as follow: 
 Doctorate: Percentage of Director with Doctoral degree on the board. 
 MBA: Percentage of director with an MBA degree on the board 
 Prestigious: Percentage of director who attended a prestigious university 
 LogBsize: Natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board 
 INDEP: The proportion of outside (non-executive) director 
4.1.4 Control variables 
Recent studies, including those by Raheja (2005), Coles et al. (2008), Boone et al. (2007), and 
Wintoki et al (2012) suggest that firms will choose their board structures based on the relative costs 
and benefits of each governance mechanism. The firm’s chosen board structure will reflect the 
monitoring costs and private benefits of control the firm faces, as well as the scope and complexity 
of its operations. Thus, as suggested by prior research, I use size, age, the number of business 
segments, growth opportunities, and leverage as determinants of board structure. Specifically, I 
define our control variables as follows: 
 LogMVE: Natural logarithm of the market value of equity. 
 MTB: ratio of market-to-book value, calculated by dividing market value of equity plus 
book value of asset minus book value of equity, all divided by book value of asset.   
 RETSTD: Standard deviation (of the past 12 months) of the firm’s stock return. 
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 Debt: Ratio of firm’s long-term debt to total asset. Long-term debt is defined as debt with 
maturity period larger than one year.  
 LogSeg: Natural logarithm of the number of business segments, which are identified by 
Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). 
Table 2 reports summary statistics of our board characteristics, firm performance and firm’s control 
variables. Average Board size is 41%, larger than that of Linck et al. (2008) dataset from 1991 to 
2003, but is consistent with that from Wang et al (2013) paper. This difference could be explained 
by the dataset’s firm size, with higher average and 75th percentile in compare to that of Linck et al. 
(2008). Larger firms have larger board, hence the data differences. Board independence is also 
slightly higher with average independence percentage increased by 7%. Independence level does 
not vary much between firm size and firm year, with 25th percentile and 75th percentile 20% apart.  
Board of education data is also retrieved from BoardEx, with three variables MBA degree, 
Doctorate degree and Prestigious. Definition and classification methodology is defined below. 
Most Boards in this sample do not have a director with an MBA degree, with median percentage 
of director with an MBA education is 0 and average is 6.4%. Doctorate degree among Board 
members is quite popular, with median of 20% per Board. One interesting observation is that 
companies from German and Switzerland have significantly higher percentage of director with 
doctorate degree than the sample average (21.76% for German and 17.52% for Switzerland). This 
statistic suggests that education level is a country-specific variable, so I decide to include country 
effect in my fixed-effect regression model. Corporate governance researches also stress the 
importance of industry effect, but I do not find significant differences between industries in my 
sample regarding Board of Director education. On average, one third of the directors from each 
firm obtained degree from prestigious universities, which is consistent with my definition of 
prestigious university in this sample (521 universities/institutions out of 2421 institutions are 
classified as prestigious).  
Majority of companies in the sample are conglomerate operating in different economic segments, 
with average number of segment per firm is 4. I use Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) 
code to cluster the company’s business into 10 sectors, including energy, materials, industrials, 
consumer discretionary, consumer utilities, health care, financials, information technology, 
telecommunication services and utilities. Sample’s leverage ratio is similar to those of researches 
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in the same period, while return volatility is slightly higher than that of Wintoki et al.(2012)’ sample. 
Return on asset, on the other hand, reduced moderately in compare to that of the period from 1991 
to 2003. Both of these numbers could be explained by macroeconomic factor, as the period in 
question is bounded by two major economic crisis: the 2000 dot com bubble and 2008 financial 
crisis, which drives the market volatility and lower return on asset in general. 
Wintoki et al. (2012) argue that board structure is highly persistent. This can reduce the power of 
panel data estimator, and dynamic estimator also requires that we assume transient errors are 
uncorrelated. The author mitigated this concern by sampling two-year interval instead of every 
year. However in this paper, due to limited dataset, I choose one-year interval, and the statistic 
from Table 3 shows that this data is varied enough for transience assumption.  
Table 3 shows the number of firm year that experience changes in board size, independence and 
Board education between 2001 and 2013. Within any two-year period, between 35% and 53% of 
my sample firms experience a change in the level of board independence (fraction of outsider) with 
average of 49%. I also find that between 17% and 43% of firms change their board size over a two 
year period, with the average of 30%. Change in board size is less common than change in board 
independence, as board independence level is under heavy regulatory scrutiny over the past decade. 
Among the education variables, change in MBA percentage is the one with most significant 
changes over the sample period, with between 52% and 68% of my sample firms experience a 
change in percentage of board members with MBA (Master of Business Administration) degree. 
Raw data analysis from BoardEx shows that MBA degree includes short-term business 
administration courses (average course period is 6 months for full-time participants) for 
experienced senior manager, so a Director could change their status of MBA degree in less than a 
year. Another plausible reason is that MBA degree is becoming more popular during the reporting 
period. By the end of the sample period, about 64% of the firm year experienced change either in 
the percentage of Doctorate, MBA or prestigious variable. This frequency of change suggests that 
there is enough time-series variation in my key variable to effectively use panel data estimation 
technique.  
4.2 Method 
In this paper, I will employ the method introduced by Wintoki et al. (2012) to address the 
relationship between board of director education and firm’s performance. The author argue that 
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large body of empirical research in the field of corporate governance is plagued with endogeneity 
issue, which leads to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates that make reliable inference 
virtually impossible. We often cannot ascertain if the causation is actually reserved (e.g 
performance drives governance) or if governance is merely a symptom of an underlying 
unobservable factor, which also affects performance. They applied a well-developed panel GMM 
estimator to address causes of endogeneity. This method improves on ordinary least square (OLS) 
or traditional fixed effects estimates in at least one of three ways. First, unlike OLS estimation, 
firm-fixed effects could be included to account for fixed unobservable heterogeneity. Second, 
unlike traditional fixed-effects estimates, it allows current governance to be influenced by previous 
realizations of, or shock to, past performance. Third, unlike either OLS or traditional fixed-effects 
estimates, a key insight of the dynamic panel GMM estimator is that if the underlying economic 
process itself is dynamic—in my case— if current governance is related to past performance—then 
it may be possible to use some combination of variables from the firm’s history as valid instruments 
to account for simultaneity. Thus, an important aspect of the methodology is that it relies on a set 
of “internal” instruments contained within the panel itself: past values of governance and 
performance can be used as instruments for current realizations of governance. This eliminates the 
need for external instruments. 
In most previous studies, the effect of board structure on performance have estimated a static model 
of the form:  
Performance = f (board structure, firm characteristics, fixed effects) 
While Wintoki et al. (2012) posit that the appropriate empirical model to address all three 
endogenity sources should be:  
Performance = f (past performance, board structure, firm characteristics, fixed effects). 
This model is based on arguments made by Hermalin and Wesibach (1998), Raheja (2005) and 
Harris and Raviv (2008), suggesting that board characteristic is a choice variable that arises through 
a process of bargaining between the various actors in a firm’s nexus contract, where the bargaining 
process is influenced by past performance and the actor’s belief about the cost and benefits of 
particular board characteristics. Thus, if board structure is dynamic and firm i (given its 
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performance at time t − 1 or earlier) chooses a board structure Xit to achieve a particular level of 
expected performance at time t, then the dynamic model for board structure is: 
     Xit = f(yit−1, yit−2 ... yit−p,Zit,ηi),                  (1) 
where X, Z, and y represent board structure, firm characteristics, and performance, respectively, 
and η represents an unobserved firm effect. 
Eq. (1) suggests that estimating the effect of board structure on firm performance, conditional on 
firm heterogeneity, requires estimating the following empirical model:  
yit = α +∑ κ𝑠y𝑖𝑡−𝑠 𝑠  +βXit +γZit +ηi +εit   s = 1,..., p,                     (2)  
where εit is a random error term and β is the effect of board characteristics on performance. 
A key aspect of Equation (2) is that board structure is a choice variable, then it must be based on 
some expectation of performance, but not necessarily the one that maximizes firm value. However, 
once the bargaining has occurred, the board has been chosen, and associated expectations have 
been set, then any unexpected changes to performance would be genuine shock with respects with 
respect to the information the firm choose its board characteristics. It means that based on the 
estimation of Equation (2), current shocks are independent of historical realization of performance 
on board structure. This is not a strong assumption, since it allows current performance to be 
influenced by past and current realization of board characteristics. The assumption leaves open the 
possibility that firms strategically choose governance to affect current or future performance. If the 
board structure that we observe today is one that trades off the anticipated costs and benefits of 
particular structures, then the unanticipated component of performance, many years in the future, 
will not be related to the board structure that is chosen today. This intuition, which can be written 
in orthogonality form as E(εit|yit−s ,Xit−s) = 0, is essentially the same as assuming weak rational 
expectations among participants in the firm’s nexus of contracts. So every endogenous time-
varying variables that affected performance, then εit would be an expectational error and the 
orthogonality assumption would be valid. However, it could be the case that endogeneous time-
varying variables that have an economically significant effect on both firm performance and board 
characteristics were omitted in equation (1).  
Sources and solution of endogeneity in the governance/performance relation. 
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As mentioned earlier, sources of endogeneity come from simultaneity and unobservable 
heterogeneity. In the board of director characteristic and firm’s performance set-up, if we assume 
firm choose their board based on a view towards achieving a particular level of performance in that 
period, then while board characteristics may affect performance, the reverse will also be true – 
board characteristics will also be affected by performance. We can say that this relationship is 
simultaneous, econometrically written as E(εit|Xit,Zit) ≠ 0 in equation (2). Wintoki et al. (2012) 
suggests that one way of solving this issue is by applying a system of equation. In one equation, 
performance is allowed to depend on governance and other control variables while in other 
equations, governance is allowed to depend on performance and other control variables. However, 
estimating this system requires us to identify strictly exogenous instruments— there must be at 
least one variable in the governance equation that is not also in the performance equation, which is 
really difficult in practice. 
Econometrically, unobservable heterogeneity exists in Eq. (2) if E(ηi |Xit,Zit)  ≠ 0. Unobservable 
heterogeneity exist in the context of board characteristics and firm performance if there are factors 
affecting both performance and explainatory variables. A potential solution to the time-invariant 
or “fixed” part of unobservable heterogeneity, if panel data are available, is a fixed-effects or 
“within” estimation. Consider the linear model:  
yt = βxt +η +εt ,       (3)  
where η represents an unobserved fixed effect. A fixed-effects transformation, which requires time-
demeaning all variables yields:  
ӱt = β ẍt  +εt ,        (4)  
where ẍ= xit − i and ӱ= yit −ӯi .  
However, what is often not recognized are the conditions under which a fixed-effects regression 
would be consistent and unbiased. A fixed-effects regression of the model in Eq. (2) would be 
consistent only if current values of the explanatory variables (governance) were completely 
independent of past realizations of the dependent variable (performance), i.e., if E(εis|Xit,Zit) = 
0,∀s,t. This means that fixed-effects estimates would be biased if past performance affects current 
values of governance. Wintoki et al.(2012) proposed to apply the dynamic GMM panel estimator 
to obtain a consistent and unbiased estimates, under the assumption that unobserved heterogeneity 
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exists but is fixed or time-invariant. This estimator was introduced by Holtz-Eakin et al.(1998) and 
Arellano and Bond (1991), and further developed in a series of papers including Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The basic estimation procedure consists of two 
essential steps. First, we write the dynamic model of (2) in first-differenced form:  
∆yit = α +κp∑ ∆𝑝 yit−p +β∆Xit +γ∆Zit +∆εit,  p > 0.      (5)  
First-differencing eliminates any potential bias that may arise from time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity. After first-differencing, the author estimate (5) via GMM using lagged values of the 
explanatory variables as instruments for the current explanatory variables. That is, they use 
historical values of performance, board structure, and other firm-specific variables as instruments 
for current changes in these variables.  
Second, the historical or lagged values must provide an exogenous source of variation for current 
governance. This means that lagged variables must be uncorrelated with the error in the 
performance equation in Eq. (2). Theory provides motivation for this. As discussed earlier, under 
the assumption of weak rational expectations, if the board structure that we observe today is one 
that trades off the anticipated costs and benefits of particular board structures, then current shocks 
to performance must have been unanticipated  when the boards were chosen. Any information from 
the firm’s past is impounded into current expected performance within p time periods. This means 
that p lags of past performance are sufficient to capture the influence of the firm’s past on the 
present, i.e., including p lags ensures dynamic completeness of Eq. (2). Provided p lags of 
performance have been included, any information from the firm’s history that is older than that has 
no direct effect on current performance and only affects performance through its effect on current 
governance and other firm characteristics. Thus, the firm’s history beyond period t − p should be 
exogenous with respect to any shocks or surprises to performance in the current or future periods. 
If the exogeneity assumptions are valid, then the following orthogonality conditions could be 
applied:  
  E(Xit−sεit) = E(Zit−sεit) = E(yit−sεit) = 0, ∀ s > p.   (6)  
However, despite the economic appeal of this procedure, it does have at least three econometric 
shortcomings. First, Beck et al. (2000) note that if the original model is conceptually in levels, 
differencing may reduce the power of the empirical tests by reducing the variation in the 
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explanatory variables. Second, Arellano and Bover (1995) suggest that variables in levels may be 
weak instruments for first-differenced equations. Third, first-differencing may exacerbate the 
impact of measurement errors on the dependent variables (Griliches and Hausman, 1986). Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) argue that these shortcomings can be mitigated, 
and improved the GMM estimator by also including the equations in levels in the estimation 
procedure. We can then use the first-differenced variables as instruments for the equations in levels 
in a “stacked” system of equations that includes the equations in both levels and differences. This 
produces a “system” GMM estimator, that involves estimating the following system: 
[
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∆yit
] = α +  κ[
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑝
∆yit − p
] +  β [
𝑿𝑖𝑡
∆𝐗it
] +  γ [
𝒁𝑖𝑡
∆𝐙it
] + εit      (7) 
Unfortunately, the equations in levels still include unobserved heterogeneity. To deal with this, the 
author assume that while the governance and control variables may be correlated with the 
unobserved effects, this  correlation is constant over time. This is a reasonable assumption over a 
relatively short time period if the unobserved effects proxy for factors like unobserved director 
ability, managerial productivity, etc. The assumption leads to an additional set of orthogonality 
conditions:  
With the system GMM estimator, they obtain efficient estimates while controlling for time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity, and the dynamic relationship between current 
values of the explanatory variables and past values of the dependent variable. Series of tests are 
carried out to test the key exogenous assumption, is that the firm’s historical performance and 
characteristics are exogenous with respect to current shocks or innovations in performance. The 
first test is a test of second-order serial correlation. The second test is a Hansen test of over-
identification. All steps of the dynamic system GMM estimator are included in the xtabond2 
function in Stata. 
5. Result 
5.1 Determine number of lags to ensure dynamic completeness 
Wintoki et al. (2012) argued that understanding how many lags of performance needed to capture 
all informational in the past is important for two reason. First of all, failure to capture all influences 
of the past on the present could mean that Eq. (2) I misspecified, i.e there might be an omitted 
variable bias. But more important, the method employs older lags that are exogenous with the 
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residual of the present as instrument for present values, so this test helps to determine how many 
lags is enough for the above two conditions. I estimate a regression of current performance on five 
lags, controlling for other firm-specific’s characteristics. Table 4 shows the result. Result suggest 
that including five lags is sufficient to capture the dynamic aspect of performance/governance 
relation. In the first column, first four lags are significant at 1% level while the older lag is 
insignificant. I eliminate the recent lag in column two and include only the fifth lag. With this 
specification, the older lag is statistically significant. Thus, while older lags may contain relevant 
information in regard to firm’s performance, that information is subsumed by more recent lags. 
One interesting observation is that performance measure at the second and fourth lags is negatively 
related to current performance measure, which suggests reversal effect of performance every other 
year in this sample.  
5.2 How strongly is the present related with the past? 
One key argument in this paper is that present board and firm characteristics are strongly correlated 
with past performance. I examine this assertion with series of test, of which the first one is an OLS 
regression of (1) current level of board characteristics variable and other firm’s specific variables 
and (2) changes in these levels on past performance and historical value of the firm-specific 
variables.  
The results are shown in Table 5, with Panel A shows results from OLS regression of the level of 
board characteristics and other firm characteristics on performance and characteristics from a year 
earlier. I find that MBA and Prestigious variables are significantly positively correlated with Return 
on Asset in the earlier year, while Doctorate are negatively related to past performance measure at 
1% significance level.  This suggests that firm usually reinforce their board of director with better 
educated directors after years with negative result, with focus on people with industrial and 
management expertise. Furthermore, current board size and independence level, as well as current 
measures of director’s education, is significantly positively related to past firm size, which suggest 
that as firm gets larger, it will have larger board with better educated directors and higher level of 
board independence. The first assessment matches those suggested by Fama and Jensen (1983), 
and documented by Boone et al.(2007), Coles et al (2008), and Linck et al. (2008). In general, all 
control and dependent variables in the level equation of equation (2) are significantly correlated 
with past values. One may argue that the effect of board of director is sticky, i.e the decisions the 
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board make in year t may only take effect in year t+2, t+3 or later on depends on the stickiness, 
making any interpretation of the Table 5 forceful. As this is only the intermediate step to check the 
endogenous level of explanatory variables, what matters is the significant level of correlation rather 
than result interpretation.  
Panel B of Table 5 shows the result from OLS regression of changes in board characteristics and 
firm characteristics on the performance levels and characteristics from a year earlier. The result 
suggests that changes in board characteristics and firm control variables strongly correlated with 
past performance. Changes in percentage of doctorate degree holding are negatively correlated to 
past performance, while changes in prestigious level are positively correlated to past performance, 
both at 1% significant. Similar logic of Panel A is applied in this table, as I do not include the 
changes of same dependent variable in the equation, as the correlation is strong and might hinder 
others. Board characteristics variables are not included in regressions with dependent variables are 
those of firm control variables, as they do not have much correlation with the variable in question. 
Table 5 shows that all the potential firm performance control variables are dynamically endogenous. 
Current levels and changes in market-to-book (MTB), natural logarithm of market value 
(LogMVE), standard deviation of stock return (RETSTD), natural logarithm of number of business 
segments (LogSeg), and leverage (Debt) are all significantly related to past performance. This 
again highlight Wintoki et al (2012) suggestion that it is not only corporate governance that can be 
considered endogenous, but also control variables proxies for the firm’s operation and performance 
are likely to be endogenous as well.  
A second test is the test of strict exogeneity suggested by Wooldridge (2002, p.285) under the 
following fixed-effect model: 
yi,t = α + βXi,t + ΩWi,t+1 + ηi + εit,        t=1999,2000,2001….2013 (8) 
where Wi,t+1 is a subset of future values of the corporate governance and control variables. Under 
strict exogeneity where Ω = 0, i.e future realization of governance and control variables are 
unrelated to current performance. 
Table 6 shows the results of equation (8), with different subsets of the governance and control 
variables, W i,t+1. In every specifications in which they are included, the coefficient estimates for 
the future value of board MBA level (MBAt+1) are significantly different from zero. Future values 
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of Doctorate (Doctoratet+1) and Prestigious (Prestigioust+1) coefficients are significantly different 
from zero in the majority of specifications in which they are included. This suggests that all the 
board of director education variables are strictly exogenous and instead adjust in response to firm 
performance. The natural logarithm of number of segments at t+1 (LogSegt+1) is omitted in the last 
specification, as number of segment should not change significantly over such short period.  
Table 5 and Table 6 suggests that all the board characteristics and firm characteristics variables 
employed in this paper are endogenous i.e not strictly exogenous. Table 6 confirms the theoretical 
prediction and the result from the OLS regressions in Table 5. 
5.3 The relation between board structure and current firm performance 
In this section, I examine the result from estimating the relation between board education and 
current firm performance. In order to show the dynamic relationship between performance and set 
of explanatory variables, as well as how the result change under different methods, I estimate the 
following models, following Wintoki  et al.(2012) specification: 
1. OLS model 
2. Fixed effect model 
3. A dynamic OLS model 
4. A dynamic fixed-effect model (system GMM) 
Table 7 reports the results of the above methods. I applied the same logic of Wintoki et al (2012) 
paper, with two lags of performance in the dynamic model. The result in Table 4 suggests that 
variables lagged five and six periods (t-5 and t-6 respectively) are suitable for all the endogenous 
variables in GMM estimates. My assumption in the GMM regression is that all regressors except 
year dummy and country dummy are endogenous. This assumption is further tested with result 
shown in Table 5. 
OLS and fixed effects static models suggest a positive relationship between all education variables 
and firm performance. Only doctorate variable shows statistically significant result in both models, 
MBA is significant in the fixed effect model while prestigious variable shows no sign of 
statistically significance. The significant correlation between education variables and firm’s 
performance confirms Hambrick and Mason (1984) upper echelon theory, which states that an 
organization outcomes – strategic choices and performance - are partially predicted by managerial 
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background characteristics, one of which is the manager’s formal education level.  The result of 
MBA degree in static fixed effect model confirms finding of Gottesman and Morey (2006) that 
managers with MBA degree poses a positive effect on the organization’s performance. The 
prestigious degree finding is similar to that of Bhagat et al (2010), which states that whether 
manager attends a prestigious university does not have significant impact on firm’s performance. 
The OLS static model also confirms result of board characteristic control variables Indep and 
LogBsize in previous literatures, with positive correlation between performance and Indep, and 
negative correlation between board size and performance. In general, static OLS tells that a small 
and independent board with well-educated board members will facilitate firm’s performance.  
Static fixed effect model, which takes into account the effect of country, industry and year, also 
supports the above statement. MBA correlation increases from 0.182 in OLS model to 0.606, with 
t-value improved from 0.41 to 2.06, making it statistically significant at 1% level. The prestigious 
variable still yield a positive yet not statistically significant relationship with performance measure. 
Note that R2 improves from 20.9% in static OLS model to 38.9% in static fixed effect model, which 
reflects that the  According to Wintoki et al.(2012), the static model does not correctly reflect the 
relationship between explanatory variables and dependent variable, as it is plagued by endogeneity 
as confirmed by the result of Table 5 and Table 6. 
Once we move to the dynamic models, all the results disappeared. In a simple OLS dynamic model, 
the percentage of MBA degree and Doctorate degree no longer significantly related to performance. 
In a dynamic OLs model, all board education variables are no longer significantly related to firm 
performance. For example, the coefficient of Doctorate is significantly positive in static OLS model 
(0.377 with t = 2.03), but is insignificant in dynamic OLS model (0.193 with t=1.69). All the signs 
of board characteristics do not change from static to dynamic model, with only board size poses 
negative effect on firm’s performance. Magnitude of the coefficients drop as well, for example 
MBA coefficient drops from 0.182 to 0.012 and Doctorate coefficient drops from 0.377 to 0.193. 
This suggests that current board characteristic is correlated with past firm performance-another 
potential indicator of the endogeneity that arises from the relation between board characteristic and 
firm performance. However, it is possible that there is some unobservable heterogeneity that is not 
captured by past performance. R2 improves from 20.9% to 47.1% in the dynamic model. In the 
OLS dynamic model, I include past performance, and through the improvement in R2, it appears 
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again that past performance explain a significant portion of the variation in current performance. 
However, note that this dynamic OLS is only an immediate step towards dynamic system GMM, 
and the result is yet to be conclusive. One clear insight that emerges from the dynamic OLS is 
explanatory power of lagged performance when assessing the relationship between corporate 
governance variables and firm performance. The system GMM model helps to estimate the 
governance/performance relationship while including both past performance and fixed-effects to 
account for the dynamic aspects of the governance/performance relation and time-invariant 
unobservable heterogeneity, respectively. 
The results show that when I include fixed-effects in a dynamic model and estimate via system 
GMM, the coefficients on all education variables are statistically insignificant. For instance, 
Doctorate coefficient is 0.06 with t-value =0.11, while MBA coefficient changes from positive to 
negative sign. Except for ROAt-1, all other explanatory variables coefficients are statistically 
insignificant. This is a sharp contrast to the results from the static fixed-effects model in which the 
coefficient on MBA and Doctorate are statistically significant and positive. The changes in 
significance level illustrates the bias arises from ignoring both unobservable heterogeneity and 
dynamic relation between board education and firm’s performance.   
One way to explain changes in the significant level of director education from simple OLS to 
dynamic GMM is through unobservable heterogeneity, which is solved in dynamic GMM model. 
Roberts and Whited (2012) noted that unobserved heterogeneity causes a bias term equal t the 
product of the effect of the omitted variable on the outcome variable, γ, and the effect of the omitted 
variable on the included variable, ϕj in the equation: 
plim βˆ j = βj + γϕj , j = 1, . . . , k 
If both γ and ϕj are positive, then the error term will be positive and thus plim βˆ j will be over-
estimated. One plausible omitted variable with positive effect on both performance and director 
variable is director’s competence. Companies with highly competence directors will have better 
strategic decisions, and better performance in the long run. Education level is also linked to one’s 
cognitive function and coherence, so directors with doctorate degree and graduate from prestigious 
university/institution are more competence than those without doctorate degree and graduate from 
less prestigious university. So not taken into account board of director competency will lead to 
overestimation of the effect of board education on firm’s performance, which explain the changes 
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in significant level of all three education variables. So one suggestion to improve the explanatory 
power of further researches in this field is to include board of director competence in the regression. 
Note that unobservable heterogeneity may explain the change in significance level, but cannot 
account for the sign flip of MBA variable.  
Another way to explain the change in significance level is due to dynamic nature of the relationship 
between board of director characteristic and firm’s performance. Suppose two firms, A and B, have 
the same average performance over t periods, likely due to their managers have similar abilities. 
Suppose at the t-1, firm A performed better than firm B due to purely exogenous events. If 
shareholder use firm performance as a proxy for managerial ability and board education variables 
are positively related to past performance, then firm A will have a slightly higher board education 
than firm B, at time t-1. However, since both firms have same average performance over the entire 
t periods, firm B will have better performance than firm A in period t. So a firm would appear to 
have better performance thanks to better educated board, while it is in fact due to a mechanical 
mean reversion of the firm’s performance. So controlling past performance will help to reveal the 
true effect of board education on firm’s performance, which is not statistically significant in this 
case. 
The dynamic GMM model also suggests no significant relationship between board independent, 
board size and firm performance, which is similar to that reported by Wintoki et al.( (2012), even 
though the sign is changed in vice versa manner (negative relationship between board size and firm 
performance, positive relationship between board independence and firm performance). Education 
 
5.4 Strengths of instruments 
In this section, I carry out a test suggested by Wintoki et al.( (2012) to check the correlation between 
endogenous variables and their instruments by carrying out a first-stage regression of all 
endogenous variable on their instruments and examine the F-statistic. If y is performance and X 
includes all the regressor, system GMM involves estimating the following:  
[
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡
] =  𝛼 +  𝛽 [
𝑿𝑖𝑡
∆𝑿𝑖𝑡
] +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
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To assess the strengths of the instruments, I split my system into its level and 1st differencing 
equation and assess the strength of (1) lagged differences as instrument in the level equation and 
(2) lagged levels as instruments in the differenced equation under the following form:  
yit = αl +βlXit +νit   Instruments: ∆Xit−5,     (19)  
and the equation in differences:  
∆yit = αd +βd∆Xit +εit   Instruments: Xit−5.     (20) 
Table 8 shows the result of my analysis. For the variables in levels, I obtained the F statistic by 
regressing each variable on all the lagged instruments used as instrument (∆Xit−5). Similarly, F 
statistic in the 1st differencing is obtained by regressing each variable on all the lagged levels used 
as instrument (Xit−5). Table 8 shows that F=statistics for all the first-stage regressions are significant, 
which implies that instruments provide significant explainatory power for the endogenous variables. 
This is determined by a rule of thumb suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997): if F-statistic is larger 
than 10, then the instrument provides significant explainatory power. So the test suggests that the 
result in table 7 is not driven by weak instruments.  
5.5 Does board characteristic affect firm performance with a lag? 
My analysis so far has focused on assessing the effect of current board characteristics on firm’s 
performance. However, it is possible that board characteristics in this period affect governance in 
the next period i.e board structure affects firm performance with a lag. It is also the case that a 
strategic decision made in time t by board of director will only take effect in years after t, and thus 
only materialize on performances of years after t. Thus, it is necessary to look into the relationship 
between board characteristics and firm performance with a lag. I applied Wintoki et al.( (2012) 
method to estimate an empirical model in the form: 
yit = α + κ1yit−1 + κ2yit−2 + κ2yit−3 + κ2yit−4 + βXit−2 +γZit−2+ηi +εit, 
where X contains the board characteristics variables and Z contains the control variables. 
Wintoki et al.( (2012) argued that estimating the effect of lagged board characteristics on current 
performance enables the research to do two things: assess the effect of board characteristics on firm 
performance using a set of different assumptions from those in Table 7. It also allows to apply an 
alternative dynamic panel estimator that does not rely on the instrument set that I used in the 
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dynamic GMM in Table 7.  Using lagged board variables in the regression does not eliminate either 
unobservable heterogeneity (since Xit-2 is possibly still correlated with ηi), or the dynamic aspect 
of the board characteristics/performance relation, since values of board structure at time t-2 could 
have been determined at periods before t-2. However, using lagged board characteristics as 
opposed to current board characteristics reduces the impact of simultaneity since past board 
characteristics and current performance are not determined in the same period. 
Table 9 shows the result of estimating the effect of current performance on lagged board 
characteristics, including board education. I show the result from simple OLS regression and 
dynamic GMM panel estimator. Both of the methods record no relation between lagged board 
education and firm’s performance. In the simple OLs model, R2 drops significantly in compare to 
that in Table 7, given the same number of explanatory variables (from 0.21 to 0.14), which signify 
the fact that past values do not explain current performance as well as present value of the same set 
of variables. So in this sample, lagged corporate governance variables do not effect current firm’s 
performance.  
6.  Conclusion 
I find no evidence that Board of Director education matters with respect to firm performance- either 
short or long term for this European dataset. All else equal, firms with better educated board of 
director may appear to have better performance in the short-run, but that superiority will likely to 
reverse in the future.This study suggests some practical implications. Even though intellectual 
competence should appear to be one of the considerations in the appointment of board members, 
the education qualification is not always a good proxy for superior advising or managerial quality. 
Education degrees are usually obtained long before the director’s appointment, thus other cognitive 
experience such as industry knowledge and network should be better parameters of a director’s 
competency. Secondly, Board of Director strategic decision usually shows material effects on 
firm’s performance with a lag, so it is important to examine the correlation between lagged 
corporate governance structure and firm’s outcome to have a more thorough understanding about 
the causality between those two elements. 
Corporate finance research’s interpretation has been complicated by endogeneity issue, with classic 
solutions including event study and external instrument variables. However, those solutions are not 
always available, and the use of lags of dependent and independent variables as instrument is a 
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valid alternative. However, note that the use of lags as instrument relies on a key assumption – the 
weak rational expectation on the part of actors in the firm’s nexus contracts, so the extend to which 
this method could be applied is limited for corporate finance studies.  
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Appendix  
University ranking tables and methodology 
A. QS University Ranking: The ranking is rated based on six performance indicators, four of which 
are based on hard data, and the remaining two are based on survey – one of academics and the 
other of employers. Each criteria carries a different weighting when calculating the overall scores. 
The primary aim of this ranking is to help students make informed comparison of leading university 
in the world. 
1. Academic Reputation (40%): Measured using a global survey, in which academics are 
asked to identify the institutions where they believe the best work is currently taking place 
within their own field of expertise. Participants are not allowed to vote for their own 
institution, and only their most recent responses are used. In average, the ranking received 
76,800 responses annually over the past 5 years. Regional weightings are applied to counter 
any discrepancies in response rates. 
2. Employer Reputation (10%): Measured using a global survey, this criteria asks employers 
to identify the universities they perceive to be producing the best graduates. A higher 
weighting is given to votes for universities that come from outside of their own country, 
which promotes the pursue of international education. 
3. Student-to-faculty ratio (20%): Measure of number of academic staff employed related to 
number of student enrolled. This indicator assume that higher level of individual 
supervision leads to better teaching quality. 
4. Citation per faculty (20%): This indicator aims to assess research’s impact. More citation 
is associated with more influence a paper/researcher has, and thus improve the academic 
impact of the university. 
  5&6.  International faculty (5%) & International student ratio (5%): These two indicators aim 
to assess how successful a university has been in attracting students and academics from other 
nations. 
B. Times Higher Education ranking: This ranking table focus on the academic achievement of 
university, with strong skewness to research citation and reputation. The performance indicators 
are grouped into five weighted areas:  
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1. Teaching (30%): Assess the learning environment of the university, with sub-indicators 
include reputation survey, staff-to-student ratio, doctorate-to-bachelor ratio, proportion of 
doctorate among academic staff and institutional income, which is scaled against staff 
number and normalized for purchasing-power parity. 
2. Research (30%): Assess the reputation, income and volume of researches from the 
university. Reputation is based on survey response from academic peers, while volume data 
is collected from Elsevier’s Scopus database per scholar, scaled for institutional size and 
normalized for subjects. Times Higher Education ranking admits that their research income 
calculation is controversial and biased. However, given the importance of funding, the 
ranking has assigned 6% weight to this criteria. 
3. Citations (30%): Scored by the number of time a university’s work is cited, with data 
extracted from Elsevier’s Scopus. The indicator is defined with reference to a global 
baseline and intrinsically accounts for differences in citation accrual over time, differences 
in citation rates for different document types (reviews typically attract more citations than 
research articles, for example) as well as subject-specific differences in citation frequencies 
overall and over time and document types. The data are fully normalised to reflect 
variations in citation volume between different subject areas. This means that institutions 
with high levels of research activity in subjects with traditionally high citation counts do 
not gain an unfair advantage. 
4. International Outlook (7.5%): Measure the international-to-domestic ratio of both staff and 
students, plus a category in which they calculate the proportion of a university’s total 
research journal publications that have at least one international co-author. 
5. Industry Income (2.5%): capture how much research income an institution earns from 
industry (adjusted for PPP), scaled against the number of academic staff it employs. 
The weight is re-calibrated for each subject, with the weightings changed to reflect different 
publication habits in different fields. 
C. Center for World University Rankings (CWUR): This ranking uses eight objective and robust 
indicators to rank the world’s top 1000 universities. 
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1. Quality of Faculty (25%): Weighted number of faculty members who have won one or 
some of prize/medal selected by the ranking. This selection contains large collection of 
awards covering virtually all academic disciplines.  
2. Quality of Education (25%): number of university alumni who have won major 
international awards, prizes and medal relative to the university’s size. Alumni is 
defined as students who obtained Bachelor, Master or Dotoral degrees. International 
awards defined in the quality of faculty part. 
3. Alumni Employment (25%): This indicator measures the weighted number of an 
institution’s alumni who currently hold CEO positions at the world’s top 2000 public 
companies relative to the institution’s size. The top companies are those listed on the 
Forbes Global 2000 list. 
4. Publication, influence, citation, broad impact and patents: for publication, the list of 
journal is obtained from Thompson Reuters’s journal citation report, with the focus on 
the number of publication in the top-tier journals in the database. Influence score is 
calculated as the sum multiple of number of publications and reputation score of each 
journal of each university. Patents registered to the World Intellectual Property 
Organization in the year T-2 are collected. Paper’s impact level is calculated by h index 
from Hirsch (2005). 
D. Academic Ranking of World University (ARWU): This ranking employs a long list of indicators, 
including Quality of Education (10%), Quality of Faculty (20%), Research Output (20%) and Per 
capital Performance (20%). The benchmark and quality definition is quite close to that of CWUR. 
Research Output is defined by number of paper published in Science Citation Index-expanded & 
Social Citation Index, and in Nature and Science.  
Each of the ranking above has some limitations, most of which comes from bias selection and 
methodology. As most of the paper citation databases are focused on papers written in English, 
university with researches written in other languages will have significantly lower score in research 
citation-related indicators. Some of the rankings only rank universities which provides Bachelor, 
Master and Doctoral studies, thus ignore higher education institutions with focus solely on post-
graduate or undergraduate education, for instance liberal arts colleges and research institutions. QS 
Ranking and Times Ranking rely on surveys, which causes data manipulation and selection biases; 
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while CWUR and ARWU employed subjective benchmarks for their quality assessment. 
University ranking is a relatively new concept with most of the ranking tables established within 
the past 15 years, and there is no widely accepted framework for ranking, so for each university in 
the director education sample, I will get the equal-weight average ranking from the available 
dataset annually. As the Director Education dataset from BoardEx is noisy with different input 
name for the same university/institution, I have to manually check and match the data as so the 
university names in the ranking and BoardEx data fit. The result is a list of 472 ranked 
universities/institutions over the sample of 2842 universities/institutions.  
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Table 1. The effect of Board of Director characteristics on firm’s performance 
This table reports the findings of previous studies that examine the impact of board characteristics on firm’s performance. Q stands for Tobin Q, 
calculated as the market value of a company divided by the replacement value of the firm's assets. ROA stands for Return on Asset, calculated by 
dividing a company's annual earnings by its total assets, and is displayed as a percentage. ROS stands for Return on Sales, calculated by dividing 
net income before interest and tax by sales. 
 
Paper Sample Period Performance Measure Relationship 
 
 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) 134 1971-1983 Q, ROA None 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) 800 1988 Q Negative 
Bhagat and Black (2002) 2002 1988-1991  Negative 
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008) 8,165 1992-2001 Q, ROA, ROS, Market 
returns 
Negative for high Research and 
Development (R&D) firms 
Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012) 6,000 1991-2003 ROA, Q None 
Black and Kim (2012) 2,165 1998-2004 Q Positive 
  
 
  
Panel A: Papers examining relationship between board independence and firm performance 
Panel B: Papers examining relationship between board size and firm performance 
Eisenberg et al. (1998) 879 1992-1994 ROA Negative 
Adams and Mehran (2005) 35 1986-1999  None 
Guest (2009) 2,745 1981-2002 ROA, Q, ROE Negative 
Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012) 6,000 1991-2003 ROA, Q None 
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Paper Sample Period Performance 
Measure 
Characteristics Relationship 
Panel C: Papers examining relationship between other board characteristics and firm performance 
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) 508 1989-1995 ROA, MTB Board Busyness Negative 
Adam and Ferreira (2009) 1,939 1996-2003 ROA, Q Gender Diversity Negative for well-governed 
firms 
Darmadi (2013) 383 2007 ROA, Q Education Positive 
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Table 2. Summary statistics of board and firm characteristics 
The table contains the sample characteristics of the board and firm characteristics of the firms used in the 
study. The results are based on a sample of 482 firms and 4,221 firm years selected every from 1999 to 
2013. The firm characteristics come from ThompsonOne while board characteristics from BoardEx. Board 
size is the total number of directors on the board. Board independence is the percentage of directors who 
are not employees of the firm. MBA degree is the percentage of director with an MBA degree. Doctorate 
degree is the percentage of director with doctorate degree. Prestigious is the percentage of director attending 
universities/institutions classified as prestigious. Firm size is the market value of equity. Segments is the 
number of business segments the firm operates in, as reported by Thompson One. Debt is the ratio in 
percentage of long-term debt to total assets. RETSTD is the standard deviation of the firm’s stock returns 
in the previous 12 months. Market-to-book is obtained as the value of equity plus book value of assets minus 
book value of equity minus deferred taxes, all divided by book value of assets. Values are shown in Mean, 
Median, 25th percentile and 75th percentile 
 
 Mean Median 25th percentile 75th percentile 
Board Characteristic 
Board Size 
Board Independence 
 
11.82 
0.77 
 
11 
0.8 
 
8 
0.67 
 
15 
0.87 
Board Education 
MBA Degree  
Doctorate Degree 
Prestigious  
 
6.4% 
28.3% 
37.9% 
 
0.00% 
20.0% 
33.0% 
 
12.5% 
12.5% 
25% 
 
42.8% 
54.2% 
53.8% 
Firm characteristic 
Firm size (million US dollars) 
Segments  
Debt (%) 
RETSTD 
Market-to-book 
Return on Assets 
 
998 
4 
17% 
19.03% 
3.18 
4.46% 
 
1,087 
4 
14% 
17.2% 
1.71 
3.11% 
 
281 
3 
2% 
2.16% 
0.93 
0.617% 
 
4,349 
6 
26% 
47.6% 
3.12 
8.92% 
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Table 3.  Summary statistics of changes in board characteristic variables 
This table contains the summary statistics of changes in board size and board independence over any two-
year period between 1999 and 2013. The results are based on a sample of 482 firms and 4,221 firm years 
selected every from 1999 to 2013. The firm characteristics come from ThompsonOne while board 
characteristics from BoardEx. Board size is the total number of directors on the board. Fraction of outsider 
is the percentage of directors who are not employees of the firm. MBA degree is the percentage of director 
with an MBA degree. Doctorate degree is the percentage of director with doctorate degree. Prestigious is 
the percentage of director attending universities/institutions classified as prestigious 
 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2001-2013 
Percent of 
firm year 
Change in fraction of outsider 
 
Change in Board size 
 
Change in Doctorate% 
 
Change in MBA % 
 
Change in Prestigious % 
 
Number of firm year 
35.7% 
 
16.67% 
 
27.49% 
 
59.44% 
 
17.77% 
 
341 
38.96% 
 
18.21% 
 
25.67% 
 
56.44% 
 
19.26% 
 
371 
42.17% 
 
27.27% 
 
31.88% 
 
61.29% 
 
19.6% 
 
296 
43.28% 
 
35.71% 
 
32.55% 
 
67.58% 
 
15.11% 
 
355 
48.91% 
 
31.16% 
 
23.07% 
 
61.84% 
 
21.41% 
 
406 
53.11% 
 
34.91% 
 
26.53% 
 
58.31% 
 
18.26% 
 
411 
51.82% 
 
43.22% 
 
28.61% 
 
52.18% 
 
17.55% 
 
387 
45.27% 
 
29.96% 
 
27.75% 
 
59.45% 
 
18.45% 
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Table 4. How many lags of firm performance are significant? 
In this table, we report results from the OLS estimation of the model: 
    yit = α1 +∑ 𝑘𝑝𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑝
𝑝=6
𝑝=1 +κZit +ηi +εit , t = 2004, 2005, 2006,…, 2013 
yit is ROA. Zit includes firm size (LogMVE), market-to-book ratio (MTB), standard deviation of stock returns 
(RETSTD), number of business segments (LogSeg), and leverage (DEBT). The results are based on a sample 
of 482 firms and 4,221 firm years selected every from 1999 to 2013. The firm characteristics come from 
ThompsonOne while board characteristics from BoardEx. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. All t-statistics 
are based on robust, firm clustered standard errors. ***, * and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable 
Performance 
ROA 
Performance 
ROA 
ROAt-1 0.445***  
   
ROAt-2 -0.139***  
   
ROAt-3 0.278***  
   
ROAt-4 -0.674***  
   
ROAt-5 0.126 0.148*** 
   
ROAt-6 -0.211 -0.392** 
   
LogMVE 0.0074** 0.00765** 
   
MTB -0.0146*** 0.0055*** 
   
RETSTD -0.0017 -0.0017 
   
LogSeg -0.175*** -0.165*** 
   
Debt -0.139** -0.206** 
   
R2 0.367 0.225 
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Table 5. Relationship between board characteristic, firm-specific variables, and past performance 
In this table we report the results of OLS regressions of current board size (LogBsize), independence (Indep), Board’s education variables (Doctorate, 
MBA and Prestigious) and current firm-specific variables, on past performance and historic values of the firm-specific variables. Performance is 
measured by return on assets (ROA). The firm-specific variables include firm size (LogMVE), market-to-book ratio (MT B), standard deviation of 
stock returns (RETSTD), number of business segments (LogSeg), and leverage (Debt). The results are based on a sample of 482 firms and 4,221 
firm years selected every from 1999 to 2013. The firm characteristics come from Thompson One while board characteristics from BoardEx. Panel 
A reports the results of the regressions in which the dependent variables are current levels. Panel B reports the results of the regressions in which 
the dependent variable is the change from t − 1 to t. All t-statistics are based on robust, firm clustered standard errors. ***, ** and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Dependent variable is level at time t 
 MBA Doctorate Prestigious Indep LogBsize LogMVE MTB RETSTD Logseg Debt 
ROAt-1 0.023*** -0.046*** 0.03*** 0.041** -0.048** 0.35 -0.27*** 5.95*** -0.077*** -0.012*** 
           
MBAt-1  0.343** -0.51*** -0.05 -0.584***      
           
Doctoratet-1 -0.008  0.137*** 0.0156 -0.102**      
           
Prestigioust-1 -0.005 0.24***  -0.048 0.016      
           
Indept-1 0.158*** 0.091 0.144**  -0.549***      
           
LogBsizet-1 -0.039*** -0.176** 0.046 -0.33***       
           
LogMVEt-1 0.0033** 0.04*** 0.042*** 0.044*** 0.107***  0.356*** -0.876*** 0.1*** 0.006*** 
           
MTBt-1 -0.005 *** -0.11** -0.0005 -0.015*** -0.01*** 0.201***  -1.439 -0.02*** -0.0003 
           
RETSTDt-1 5.79e - 06 0.01*** -0.047*** -0.001*** -0.0004 0.007 -0.011  0.003 0.000003 
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LogSegt-1 -0.002 0.094** -0.144*** 0.039 0.181*** 3.392*** -0.711 -15.51  -0.0081 
           
Debtt-1 0.115*** 0.06 -0.059 0.067* 0.166** 4.284*** 1.04 19.3 -0.449***  
           
R2 0.36 0.57 0.46 0.39 0.18 0.11 0.16 0.22 0.27 0.09 
 
 
Panel B: Dependent variable is change from t −1 to t 
 
∆MBA 
 
∆Doctorate 
 
∆Prestigious 
 
∆Indep 
 
∆LogBsize 
 
∆LogMV
E 
 
∆MTB 
 
∆RETSTD 
 
∆Logseg 
 
∆Debt 
 
ROAt-1 -0.004 -0.003*** 0.005*** 0.01** 0.015** 0.113** 0.131*** 0.93 -0.277*** -0.014*** 
           
MBAt-1  0.0912 -0.04 -0.015*** -0.026***      
           
Doctoratet-1 -0.006**  -0.028*** -0.002 0.024***      
           
Prestigioust-1 -0.005 -0.019  0.032*** -0.02***      
           
Indept-1 -0.005*** 0.04*** -0.017  -0.063      
           
LogBsizet-1 -0.018** 0.046** -0.003*** -0.022***       
           
LogMVEt-1 0.003** -0.006** 0.002 0.001*** 0.002  -0.044 0.108*** 0.01*** 0.004*** 
           
MTBt-1 -0.0002 0.002 -0.001 0.0002 0.001 -0.016  0.09*** 0.0008 -0.002 
           
RETSTDt-1 0.0005 0.00008 0.001** 0.001 -0.001*** 0.006 0.009  0.00002 0.0003 
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LogSegt-1 0.0057*** -0.016 -0.0006 0.009 -0.01 0.237 0.48** 0.06  -0.016** 
           
Debtt-1 -0.008** 0.034 0.072** -0.0062 0.031 0.866 1.38** -0.96 0.12***  
           
R2 0.26 0.28 0.18 0.09 0.26 0.08 0.31 0.22 0.18 0.08 
 
  
 
 
54 
   
Table 6. Does board characteristic adjust to past performance? Tests of strict exogeneity 
In this table, we report results from the fixed-effects estimation of the model:  
        yi,t = α + βXi,t + Ωi,t+1 + ηi + εit,        t=1999,2000,2001….2013 
where Wit+1 is a subset of forward values of the corporate governance and control variables, X. y is firm 
performance (ROA). X includes board size (LogBSIZE), board independence (INDEP), Board’s education 
variables (Doctorate, MBA and Prestigious), firm size (LogMVE), market-to-book ratio (MTB), standard 
deviation of stock returns (RETSTD), number of business segments (LogSeg), and leverage (Debt). The 
results are based on a sample of 482 firms and 4,221 firm years selected every year (from 1999 to 2013). 
The board variable data come from BoardEX. The firm characteristics come from Thompson One. Ω = 0 is 
the null hypothesis of strict exogeneity. All t-statistics are based on robust, firm clustered standard errors. 
*, ** and *** represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
MBAt -0.07 -0.075 -0.069 0.35 -0.095 0.228 0.24 
        
Doctoratet 0.482 0.48 -0.084 0.487 0.465 0.275 0.314 
        
Prestigioust 0.02 0.014 0.038 0.012 0.174 0.082 0.075 
        
Indept -0.076 -0.16 -0.038 -0.064 -0.058 -0.19 0.403 
        
LogBsizet -0.504 -0.583 -0.547 -0.583 -0.565 -0.552 -0.464 
        
LogMVEt 0.11*** 0.108*** 0.102*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.107*** 0.031*** 
        
MTBt 0.0014 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.0022 0.0028 0.016 
        
RETSTDt 0.002 0.0024 0.003 0.0026 0.002 0.0027 -0.001 
        
LogSegt 0.18*** 0.177** 0.175*** 0.177*** 0.17*** 0.175*** 0.16** 
        
Debtt 0.005 0.006 0.02 0.019 0.005 0.026 -0.156 
        
MBAt+1    -0.474***  -0.346** -0.348** 
        
Doctoratet+1   -0.441***   -0.232 -0.21 
        
Prestigioust+1     -0.216 -0.216 -0.065 
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Indept+1  0.117    0.152 0.403 
        
LogBsizet+1 -0.108     -0.011 -0.14 
        
LogMVEt+1       0.08 
        
MTBt+1       -0.018** 
        
RETSTDt+1       0.004 
        
LogSegt+1       ommitted 
        
Debtt+1       0.165 
        
R2 0.127 0.127 0.139 0.144 0.13 0.147 0.160 
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Table 7. The effect of board characteristic on current firm performance. 
In this table, I report results from the estimation of the model: 
    yit = α1 + κ1yit-1 + κ2yit-2 + κ3yit-3 + κ4yit-4 + βXit + γZit  + ηi + εit,  t= 2003, 2004, 2005,….,2013 
 yit is return on assets (ROA) which is defined as operating income divided by assets. Xit includes board size 
(LogBsize), board independence (Indep), Board’s education variables (Doctorate, MBA and Prestigious). 
Zit includes firm size (LogMVE), market-to-book ratio (MTB), standard deviation of stock returns 
(RETSTD), number of business segments (LogSeg), and leverage (Debt). The results are based on a sample 
of 482 firms and 4,221 firm years selected every year (from 1999 to 2013). The board variable data come 
from BoardEX. The firm characteristics come from Thompson One. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
For the static models, it is assumed that κ1 = κ2 =0. All t-statistics are based on robust, firm-clustered standard 
errors. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%,5% and 10% level respectively. AR(1) and AR(2) are 
tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no 
serial correlation. The Hansen test of over-identification is under the null that all instruments are valid. The 
Diff-in-Hansen test of exogeneity is under the null that instruments used for the equations in levels are 
exogenous. The instruments used in the GMM estimation are: differenced equations: yit_5, yit_6, Xit_5, Xit_6, 
Zit_5, Zit_6, ∆Dit ; level equations: ∆yit_5, ∆Xit_5, ∆Zit_5, Dit . 
 
  Static Model  Dynamic Model 
Dependent Variable ROA  Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Pooled  OLS System GMM 
MBA  0.182 0.606**  0.012 -0.02 
       
Doctorate  0.377*** 0.227***  0.193 0.06 
       
Prestigious  0.013 0.081  0.012 0.0055 
       
Indep  0.45** 0.63  0.23 0.25 
       
LogBsize  -0.45*** -0.193  -0.026 -0.175 
       
LogMVE  0.134*** 0.093***  0.017*** -0.0001 
       
MTB  -0.043*** -0.029***  -0.001*** -0.019 
       
RETSTD  0.00007 0.0023  -0.0022 0.00067 
       
LogSeg  0.123 0.046  -0.15*** 0.185 
       
Debt  -0.089 -0.26  -0.124 -0.27 
       
ROAt-1     0.4*** 0.518** 
 
 
57 
 
       
ROAt-2     -0.147*** -0.0078 
       
ROAt-3     0.27*** 0.341 
       
ROAt-4     -0.63*** 0.095 
       
R2  0.21 0.39  0.47  
AR(1) test (p-value)      0.559 
AR(2) test (p-value)      0.726 
Hansen test of over-
identification (p-value) 
 
  
 
 1 
Diff-in-Hansen tests of 
exogeneity (p-value)   
 
 1 
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Table 8. First stage regression and for System GMM estimates 
In this table, I report the F-statistics and R2s of OLS first-stage regressions of levels and first-differenced 
variables on lagged differences and lagged levels respectively. The variables are board size (LogBsize), 
board independence (Indep), Board’s education variables (Doctorate, MBA and Prestigious), firm size 
(LogMVE), market-to-book ratio (MTB), standard deviation of stock returns (RETSTD), number of 
business segments (LogSeg), and leverage (Debt). The results are based on a sample of 482 firms and 4,221 
firm years selected every year (from 1999 to 2013). The board variable data come from BoardEX. The firm 
characteristics come from Thompson One. For the levels variables (X), the dependent variables are: 
∆LogBsizet-5, ∆Indept-5, ∆MBAt-5, ∆Prestigioust-5, ∆Doctoratet-5, ∆LogMVEt-5, ∆MTBt-5, ∆RETSTDt-5, 
∆Logsegt-5, ∆Debtt-5, ∆ROAt-5; year, firm and industry dummies. For the first-differenced variables (∆X), 
the dependent variables are: MBAt-5, Prestigioust-5, Doctoratet-5, LogBsizet-5, Indept-5, LogMVEt-5, MTBt-5, 
RETSTDt-5, LogSegt-5, Debtt-5, ROAt-5, year and firm and industry dummies.  
 F-statistic P-value R
2 
MBA 24.71 0.00 0.062 
    
Doctorate 43.48 0.00 0.11 
    
Prestigious 19.67 0.00 0.054 
    
Indep 63.14 0.00 0.19 
    
LogBsize 9.61 0.00 0.026 
    
LogMVE 19.76 0.00 0.057 
    
MTB 29.80 0.00 0.094 
    
RETSTD 18.88 0.00 0.056 
    
LogSeg 55.12 0.00 0.15 
    
Debt 40.31 0.00 0.12 
    
 
 F-statistic P-value R
2 
∆MBA 0.182 0.00 0.04 
    
∆Doctorate 22.08 0.00 0.032 
    
∆Prestigious 21.14 0.00 0.031 
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∆Indep 65.48 0.00 0.11 
    
∆LogBsize 21.77 0.00 0.036 
    
∆LogMVE 52.72 0.00 0.086 
    
∆MTB 48.11 0.00 0.073 
    
∆RETSTD 19.40 0.00 0.028 
    
∆LogSeg 47.53 0.00 0.071 
    
∆Debt 31.39 0.00 0.044 
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Table 9. The effect of lagged board characteristic on current firm performance 
In this table, I report results from the estimation of the model:  
Yit = α1 + κ1yit-1 + κ2yit-2 + κ3yit-3 + κ4yit-4 + βXit-2 +γZit-2 +θDit + ηi + εit,      t=2003, 2004, 2005,….,2013 
yit is return on assets (ROA) which is defined as operating income divided by assets. Xit includes board size 
(LogBsize), board independence (Indep), and Board’s education variables (Doctorate, MBA and 
Prestigious). Zit includes firm size (LogMVE), market-to-book ratio (MTB), standard deviation of stock 
returns (RETSTD), number of business segments (LogSeg), and leverage (Debt). Dit includes year dummy, 
industry dummy and sector dummy. The results are based on a sample of 482 firms and 4,221 firm years 
selected every year (from 1999 to 2013). The board variable data come from BoardEX. The firm 
characteristics come from Thompson One. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. For the static models, it 
is assumed that κ1 = κ2=0. All t-statistics are based on robust, firm-clustered standard errors. ***,** and * 
represent significance at the one percent, 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests 
for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial 
correlation. The Hansen test of overidentification is under the null that all instruments are valid. The Diff-
in-Hansen tests of exogeneity is under the null that instruments used for the equations in levels are 
exogenous. The instruments used in the GMM estimation are: differenced equations: yit-5, yit-6, Xit-5, Xit-6, 
Zit-5, Zit-6, ∆Dit; level equations: ∆yit-5, ∆Xit-5, ∆Zit-5, ∆it.  
Dependent variable (ROA(t))  Pooled OLS System GMM 
MBAt-2  -0.29 -0.15 
    
Doctoratet-2  0.17 0.075 
    
Prestigioust-2  0.074 0.01 
    
Indept-2  0.78 0.15 
    
LogBsizet-2  -0.49 0.014 
    
LogMVEt-2  0.129 0.004 
    
MTBt-2  -0.115 -0.0008 
    
RETSTDt-2  0.0005 -0.0006 
    
LogSegt-2  0.088 0.023 
    
Debtt-2  -0.28 -0.029 
    
ROAt-1   0.416*** 
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ROAt-2   -0.172 
    
ROAt-3   0.251 
    
ROAt-4   0.181 
    
R2  0.14  
AR(1) test (p-value)   0.226 
AR(2) test (p-value)   0.312 
Hansen test of over-
identification (p-value) 
 
 1 
Dif-in-Hansen tests of 
exogeneity (p-value) 
 
 1 
          Robust, but weakened by many instruments. 
 
